TheForgottenDinnerGuest： TheBeyondaReasonableDoubt StandardinaMotionforaJudgment ofAcquittalinaFederalBenchTrial JaredKneitelt Abstract Incomparisontociviltrials，criminaltrialsaredecidedonmorestringentstandardsofproofHowever，motionsforjudgmentofacquittalincriminalnonjurytrialsarecurrentlydecidedonamerelegalsufficiencystandardasopposedtothebeyondareasonabledoubtstandard。ThisArticleexaminesthelackofreasoninganduniformityindecidingthesemotionsaswellasthepotentialdangersandinjusticesposedtoadefendantbyapplyingalowerstandard。Throughanexaminationofbothdomesticandforeignlaw，theauthorarguesforthe applicationofthebeyondareasonabledoubtstandardwhendeterminingmotionsforjudgmentofacquittalincriminalnonjurytrials。 WelcometotheDinnerParty：Introduction Thestandardforjudgingaciviltrialislowerthanthestandardfor judgingguiltinacriminaltrial，andthereisnojuryinanonjurytrial。 Somehowdespitethesetwoveryobviousconclusionsthenineteenth centurystandardfordeterminingamotionforadirectedverdictinacivil jurytrialisstillappliedtoourmodemmotionforajudgmentofacquittal inacriminalnonjurytrial。 Inacriminaltrial，atthecloseofthegovernment39；scaseinchief，the defensemaymakeamotionforajudgmentofacquittalononeormore offensescharged。39；Ifthemotionisunsuccessfulandthedefensecalls acase，thedefensemaymakeanothermotionforajudgmentofacquittal atthecloseofitscase。ThisArticleconcernsonlythemotionattheend ofthegovernment39；scase。Atpresent，themotionwillsucceedonlyifthe governmenthasnotpresentedlegallysufficient39；evidenceofallthe elementsoftheparticularoffenseoroffenses。 ThisArticlediscusseswhy，inanonjurytrial，thebeyondareasonable doubtstandardshouldbeappliedinsteadofmerelythelegal sufficiencystandardwhenthebenchconsidersamotionforajudgment ofacquittal。Notknowingwhetherthegovernmenthasproveninthe judge39；smindthedefendant39；sguiltbeforeinvitingthedefendanttocall acaseactuallymilitatesagainstthepresumptionofinnocence，the assurancethatthegovernmentdischargesitsburden，andthedefendant39；s righttoremainsilent。 ThisArticleshowsthatthejurisprudenceintheUnitedStates improperlycites，forthestandardfordeterminingwhethertograntor denyamotionforajudgmentofacquittalinanonjurytrial，eitherthe standardinajurytrialorthestandardforappellatereview。ThisArticle examinesthehistorical（lackof）developmentofthemotionfora judgmentofacquittalandtheperceivedconstitutionalpreclusionagainst thebeyondareasonabledoubtstandard。Namely，thebenchasthe arbiteroflawcannotusurpadefendant39；sSixthAmendmentprotection tobetriedonthefactsbyajuryofhispeers。39；Ofcourse，inanonjury trial，39；hence，there isnoSixthAmendmentpreclusion。 Atpresent，thereisnoruleintheFederalRulesofCriminalProcedure explicitlygoverningamotionforajudgmentofacquittalinabenchtrial。 IsitRule236（JuryorNonjuryTrial）orRule2939；（Motionfora JudgmentofAcquittal〔inaJuryTrial〕）thatgovernsthemotion？ Althoughdistrictcourtjudgesinalmostallofthereporteddecisions assumeRule29governs，thereareseveralcasesinwhichdistrictcourt judgeshaveturnedtoRule23asthegoverningstatute。39；Further，even amongtheauthorsoftreatisesontheFederalRulesofCriminalProcedure， thereisdisagreementastowhatRulegoverns。39；Wright39；sFederal PracticeandProcedurediscussesamotionforajudgmentofacquittal inabenchtrialunderRule29。oYetMoore39；sFederalPracticestates， Rule29hasnorealapplicationwhenacaseistriedbythecourtsince thepleaofnotguiltyasksthecourtforajudgmentofacquittal。 ThisArticleconcludesbyproposinganewRule29（e）toresolvethis ambiguityandtomakeclearthatthebeyondareasonabledoubtstandard isthestandardthatshouldbeemployedindeterminingamotionfor ajudgmentofacquittalinabenchtrial。 I。ByInvitationOnly：RespondezS39；ilVousPlait Athegovernment bearstheburdenofprovingthecriminaldefendantguiltybeyond andthegovernment（notthedefendant）must introduceevidencesufficienttopersuadethefactfinder，beyonda reasonabledoubt，ofthedefendant39；sguilt。14Thus，ifthegovernmentdoes notintroduceevidencetoprovethedefendantguiltybeyondareasonable doubt，thenthedefendantisnotguilty。 Attheconclusionofthegovernment39；scase，thegovernment39；scase willpresumablyandinalmostallcircumstancesbeatitshighest。If thegovernmenthasnotprovenitscasebeyondareasonabledoubtafter thepresentationofitsevidence，whenwilliteverbeabletoproveitscase beyondareasonabledoubt？Thisbegstheverysimplequestion：Ifthe defendantisnotguiltyattheconclusionofthegovernment39；scaseinchief， whyshouldthedefendantbeinvitedtocalladefense？ Althoughthegovernmentmayhavepresentedlegallysufficient evidenceoftheoffensescharged，thejudgestillmaynotfindattheclose ofthegovernment39；scasethatthegovernmentproveditscasebeyonda reasonabledoubt。Forexample，thejudgemayfindtheaccountsofthe governmentwitnessestobeunworthyofbelief（eitheraloneorin combination）orcircumstantialevidencepresentedtobetoocircumspect tosustainaconviction。Asalways，thegovernmentmustproveitscase beyondareasonabledoubt。Thisburdeniswithouttheassistanceofany defenseevidence（includingthedefendant39；stestimony）。 Effectively，invitingthedefendanttocalladefensecasedespite theuncertaintyofwhetherthegovernmenthasproveditscasebeyond areasonabledoubtatthecloseofitscaseandwhetherthejudgewould haveacquittedthedefendantofanoffensechargedreducesthegovemment39；s burdenatthatstage。Thisinvitationtothedefendanttocall defensewitnessesorforthedefendanttotestifyonhisownbehalf militatesagainstthegovernment39；sobligationtoproveitscase。Suchan invitationshouldbecorrectlyconsideredasnotonlyareductionofthe government39；sburden（andthereforeimpermissibleburdenshifting）but alsoaviolationofdueprocess。39； Elevatingthegovernment39；sburdenatthemotionforajudgmentof acquittalstagetobeyondareasonabledoubtactuallystrengthensthe presumptionthatthedefendantisnotguiltyandproperlyholdsthe governmenttoitsburden。Thisstrengthenstherequirementthatthe governmentproveitscasebasedsolelyonitsownevidenceandwithout theassistanceoftheintroductionofadefensecase。 1I。TheForgottenDinnerGuest： HistoricalDevelopmentofthe MotionforaJudgmentofAcquittal Themotionforajudgmentofacquittalincriminalsuitsevolvedfrom itscounterpartincivilprocedure。Federally，inthelate1700s，civil then， andfinally，inthemidnineteenth century，thecivilmotionforadirectedverdictemerged。7 Themotionforjudgmentofacquittalincriminalcasescamestilllater andwasprobablyinfluencedbytheseearlierdevelopmentsinthecivil trial。Theearlycasesdirectingacquittaldidsowithoutcitingany authoritybutapparentlyassumedsuchpowerwasinherentinthejudge39；s roleaspresidingofficer。39；9 Indeed，Moore39；sFederalPracticestatesthatRule29（Motionfor aJudgmentofAcquittalinajurytrial）oftheFederalRulesofCriminal ProcedurewasmodeledonRule50oftheFederalRulesofCivil Procedure。20Thus，amotionforacquittal〔inajurytrial〕isequivalent toamotionforadirectedverdict（nowcalled39；judgmentasamatterof law39；underCivilRule50），orjudgmentnotwithstandingtheverdict （judgmentn。o。v。）underpreRulespractice。21 However，therestillremainsnolegislationspecificallydirected towardsamotionforajudgmentofacquittalinacriminalbenchtrial。 Thisisduetolegislativeoversightbased，seemingly，onthemere importationofthestandardsemployedinaciviljurytrialintoacriminal nonjurytrialwithoutappropriateconsiderationforthedefendant39；s exposuretoadeprivationofhisliberty，hisrighttoremainsilent，the government39；sburdenofprovingthedefendantguiltybeyondareasonable doubtratherthanbyapreponderance，andthepresumptionofthe defendant39；sinnocence。 III。TheHeadoftheTable： ThePrevailingLegalSufficiencyStandard Thestandardforjudgingamotionforajudgmentofacquittalina jurytrialatleastisbasedonBurksv。UnitedStates。Theprevailing rulehaslongbeenthatadistrictjudgeistosubmitacasetothejuryif theevidenceandinferencestherefrommostfavorabletotheprosecution wouldwarrantthejury39；sfindingthedefendantguiltybeyondareasonable doubt。23Eventhetrialcourt，whichhasheardthetestimonyofwitnesses firsthand，isnottoweightheevidenceorassessthecredibility ofwitnesseswhenitjudgesthemeritsofamotionforacquittal。24This viewisacceptedontheSixthAmendmentrightthatadefendantbetried byajuryofhispeers。Injurytrials，thecourtcannotsubstituteits judgmentforthatofthejury。25Todosowouldusurpthepowerofthe juryandviolatetheSixthAmendmentguaranteetobetriedbyone39；s peers26aswellastheFifthandFourteenthAmendments39；dueprocess protections。 Todate，however，theSupremeCourthasnotconsideredthestandard onamotionforajudgmentofacquittalinanonjurytrial。Thismight bebecauseesteemedanderuditepractitionershaveeffectivelywritten offconsideringthebeyondareasonabledoubtstandardinbenchtrials and，assuch，theissuehasnotreachedtheSupremeCourt。Forexample， Section467ofWright39；sFederalPracticeandProcedurestates，A motionforjudgmentofacquittalatthecloseoftheprosecution39；s evidenceinacasetriedtothecourtisconsideredbythesamestandard asinajurycase。29However，noneofthecasesWrightreliesonforthis propositioninSection467areonpoint。 IV。TheUnwelcomeGuest： WhenWrightIsWrong Forsupport，WrightcitesUnitedStatesv。Salman，oUnitedStatesv。 Pierce，339；UnitedStatesv。MagallonJimenez，32UnitedStatesv。Carter， andUnitedStatesv。Stubler34noneofwhichweredecidedbytheUnited StatesSupremeCourt。Salmaninvolvedapretrialdismissalofan indictment。Pierceinvolvedthetesttobeappliedinappellatereview ofthesufficiencyofevidenceafteratrial，juryorbench，andquoted Jacksonv。Virginiafortheappellatestandard。Thus，Piercedidnot concernadeterminationbythetrialcourtonamotionforacquittal。 BothMagallonJimenezandCarterheldthat，inbothjuryandbench trials，thereissufficientevidencetosupportaconvictionif，viewingthe evidenceinthelightmostfavorabletothe〔government〕，anyrationaltrier offactcouldhavefoundtheessentialelementsofthecrimebeyonda reasonabledoubt。AswithPierce，MagallonJimenezandCarter concernedtheappellatereviewofthesufficiencyoftheevidenceanddid notrelatetoadeterminationofamotionforacquittalattriallevel。40 Outofthosefivecases，Stublerwastheonlyonethathappenedtobe abenchtrial。439；InStubler，thedefendantmovedforajudgmentof acquittalafterhewasconvicted。42ThedistrictcourtheldthatRule29 oftheFederalRulesofCriminalProcedureallowsforamotionfor judgmentofacquittal〔，and〕〔t〕hestandardthecourtmustapplyis whether39；theevidenceisinsufficienttosustainaconviction。Further， thedistrictcourtheldthisstandardremainsthesame〔evenin〕anonjury trial。39；Inasurprisedemonstrationofalackofunderstandingofthe standardStublercitedcivilcaselawregardingtheAgeDiscrimination inEmploymentActtosupportthatholding。45 Wright39；sFederalPracticeandProceduredemonstratesbyitscitation totheseinappositecasesthatithasnotappropriatelyanalyzedthe jurisprudenceinmakingitsassertionthatthestandardinabenchtrialis thesameasinajurytrial。Noneofthesecasesconcernatrialleveldetermination ofamotionforajudgmentofacquittalinabenchtrialatthe conclusionofthegovernment39；sevidence。Thus，Wrighthaspropounded abaselesspropositiononamerecursoryexamination，preventinga properanalysisofthestandard。Amorethoroughexaminationis warranted。 V。ANostalgicAffair： LetUsGoBacktoCamp IntheUnitedStates，thereareonlythreecasesfoundtodateinwhich thebeyondareasonabledoubtstandardwasdiscussedinabenchtrial： UnitedStatesv。Camp，46UnitedStatesv。Laikin，4andUnitedStatesv。 CascadeLinenSupplyCorp。ofNewJersey。8 InCamp，atwodefendantcasetriedbeforeadistrictjudge，amotion forajudgmentofacquittalwasmadeafterthecloseofthegovernment39；s evidenceandbeforeeitherdefendantputonacase。49Thecourtexpressly consideredwhetherthestandardonthemotionshouldbewhetherthe evidencewasinsufficienttosustainaconvictionandheld，logically， thatstandardmeantwhetherthegovernment39；sevidenceprovedthe defendantguiltybeyondareasonabledoubt。oAccordingtothecourt， ifthegovernmentdidnotprovethedefendantguiltyandthecasewere toproceed，continuingwiththecase wouldputuponthedefendanttheriskthatbyhisownevidence，asby testimonyproducedoncrossexamination，hemightsupplytheevidence whichconvincesthetrieroffactofhisguilt，whereabsentsuchevidence thetrieroffactwouldnotbesoconvinced。Tosubjectthedefendantina criminalcasetosuchariskwouldbecontrarytotheprinciplesbywhichthe criminallawhasdevelopedin〔theUnitedStates〕。Itwouldineffectrequire thedefendanttoassistinprovidingavitalelementoftheevidencewhich convictshim。 Thus，Campallowedforacoordinatedeffortof（1）thepresumptionof innocence，（2）thegovernment39；sevidentiaryburdenofprovingthe defendantguilty（ifitcan），and（3）thedefendant39；srighttoremainsilent toprotectthedefendantfromconviction。 WhileCamp39；sreasoningappearssensible，somecourtshaveexpressly rejectedtheCamplogic。InLaikin，thedefendantinabenchtrial requestedthecourttoconsiderwhether，onhismotionforajudgment ofacquittal，thegovernment39；sevidenceprovedhimguiltybeyonda reasonabledoubt。TheLaikincourt，citingtheSeventhCircuitcaseof UnitedStatesv。Feinberg5，4heldthatthecorrectstandardistakingthe government39；sevidenceinthelightoraspectmostfavorabletothe government。TheFeinbergcourt，inmakingitsholding，citedGlasser v。UnitedStates，57UnitedStatesv。Velasco，andUnitedStatesv。 DeNiro。9However，Glasser，Velasco，andDeNiroeachrefertothe standardofappellatereview。60 UnitedStatesv。CascadeLinenSupplyCorp。ofNewJerseyP39；similarly declinedtofollowCamp。62Thedefendantsinabenchtrialmoved forjudgmentsofacquittalafterthecloseofthegovernment39；sevidence。 CampwasnotfollowedinCascadeLinenbecausethedistrictjudge heldwithoutcitinganyauthoritythatdeterminingwhetherthegovernment proveditscasebeyondareasonabledoubtatthecloseofthe government39；scasewouldseverelyimpairtheorderlydispositionofthe issues。Thejudgealsoheld，againwithoutcitinganyauthority，that determiningthemotionusingthebeyondareasonabledoubtstandard wouldbetantamounttosubmittingtheevidencetothetrierofthefacts twice。Tothisdefendantsarenotentitled。65 Thejudgefurtherindicated，withoutdiscussion，that〔hewas〕unable tounderstand〔the〕defendants39；contentionsthatthepresumptionoftheir innocenceandtheirrighttoremainsilentandoffernoproof〔were〕in somewaydiminishedorimpairedby〔his〕ruling。6Fromthelanguage andtoneinCascadeLinen，itappearsthejudgewaseagertoconvictthe defendants。Indeed，afterthedefendants39；respectivemotionsforjudgment ofacquittalweredenied，thedefendantsrested。39；Theywerethen convicted。68 Hereinliestheproblem。Thecourtcanreadilydenyamotionfora judgmentofacquittal。Uponthisdenial，thedefendantisstillleftto speculateandguesswhetherthegovernmentsatisfieditsburdenonthe government39；sevidenceofprovingthedefendantguiltybeyondareasonable doubt。Thus，notknowingwhetherthegovernmenthasdischarged itsburdenleavesthepresumptionofinnocenceandthedefendant39；s righttoremainsilentincompetitionwiththegovernment39；s obligationtodischargeitsburdenwhen，infact，thesethreeaimsshould becooperatingwithoneanother。 VI。PasstheSalt： TheInternationalTribunalsAnExercise inImpermissibleBurdenShifting Asacomparativestudy，considerthattheproceedingsbeforeinternational warcrimestribunalsarebenchtrials。Althoughinanumberof instancesthebeyondareasonabledoubtstandardwasarguedby defensecounselonamotionforajudgmentofacquittalatthecloseof thegovernment39；scase，70theuseofthelegalsufficiencystandardbecame settledlaw。Unfortunately，thiswaswithoutthebenefitofanyreal analysis。 TheAppealsChamberJudgementinProsecutorv。Jelisidisthe leadingcaseamongtheinternationaltribunalsforuseofthelegal sufficiencystandardindeterminingamotionforajudgmentof acquittalknownasRule98biS73atthecloseoftheprosecution39；s evidence。 TheAppealsChamberinJelisidfollowed74itspriorAppealsChamber JudgementinProsecutorv。Delalid，whichinturncitedtheAppeals ChamberJudgementinProsecutorv。Tadie，theAppealsChamber JudgementinProsecutorv。Aleksovski，nandtheTrialChamber39；s DecisiononMotionforAcquittalinProsecutorv。Kunara78for support。 However，thoseportionsofAleksovskiandTadidreferredtobythe DelalidAppealsChamberJudgementconcernthestandardofappellate reviewindeterminingwhetheratrialchamber39；sfactualfindingcan withstandappellatescrutinythatis，legalsufficiency。79Assuch，Tadid andAleksovskiareincorrectlycitedbyDelalidforthepropositionthat thestandardatrialcourtsittingwithoutajuryshouldusetodetermine amotionforajudgmentofacquittalisalsolegalsufficiency。 TheTrialChamber39；sDecisiononMotionforAcquittalinProsecutor v。Kunara6heldcitingtheTrialChamber39；sDecisiononDefence MotionsforJudgementofAcquittalinProsecutorv。Kordi839；thatthe appropriatetesttobeappliedonamotionforajudgmentofacquittal wasnotwhethertherewasevidencewhichsatisfiedtheTrialChamber beyondreasonabledoubtoftheguiltoftheaccused（asthedefencein thatcasehadargued），butratheritwaswhethertherewasevidenceon whichareasonableTrialChambercouldconvict。82 Allthingsconsidered，theTrialChamberinKunaraldiditsbestnot toimpugnthepriorjurisprudenceontheissue。Thus，Kunarad，shifting theburdenofproofofftheshouldersoftheprosecution，notedwithout citinganyauthoritythat 〔i〕ftheTrialChamberwereentitledtoweighquestionsofcreditgenerally whendeterminingwhetherajudgmentofacquittalshouldbeentered，and ifitfoundthatsuchajudgmentwasnotwarranted，theperceptionwould necessarilybecreated（whetherornotitisaccurate）thattheTrialChamber hadacceptedtheevidenceoftheprosecution39；switnessesascredible。Such aconsequencewouldthenleadtotwofurtherperceptions：（1）thatthe accusedwillbearatleastanevidentiaryonustopersuadetheTrialChamber toalteritsacceptanceofthecredibilityoftheprosecution39；switnesses，and （2）thattheaccusedwillbeconvictedifhedoesnotgiveevidencehimself。 Hewouldvirtuallyberequiredtowaivetherightgiventohimbythe Tribunal39；sStatutetoremainsilent。83 AnanalysisofKordithecasespawningtheseminalmisunderstanding oftheproperapplicationofamotionforajudgmentofacquittalatthe internationaltribunalsisthuswarranted。 First，theTrialChamberinKordidseemedsatisfiedthatbecauseother trialchambersattheInternationalCriminalTribunalfortheformer Yugoslaviawereusingastandardlowerthanbeyondareasonabledoubt， usingalowerstandardwastheappropriatethingtodo。Withoutany analysis，theTrialChamberindicatedthat〔i〕mplicitinRule98bis proceedingsisthedistinctionbetweenthedeterminationmadeatthe halfwaystageofthetrial，andtheultimatedecisionontheguiltofthe accusedtobemadeattheendofthecase，onthebasisofproofbeyond areasonabledoubt。TheTrialChamberfailedtoprovideanybasisor reasoningforthatdistinction。 Next，theKordidTrialChamberlookedtotheTrialChamber39；s DecisiononDefenceMotiontoDismissChargesinProsecutorv。 Tadid，theTrialChamber39；sOrderontheMotionstoDismissthe IndictmentattheCloseoftheProsecutor39；sCaseinProsecutorv。 Delali6，theTrialChamber39；sDecisionofTrialChamberIonthe DefenceMotiontoDismissinProsecutorv。Blaikid，andtheTrial Chamber39；sDecisiononMotionforWithdrawaloftheIndictmentagainst theaccusedVlatkoKupregki6inProsecutorv。Kupregkid。 TheTrialChamberinTadidmerelyheldwithoutcitingany authoritythat，becauseitwouldultimatelydeterminewhethereach countwasprovenbeyondareasonabledoubtattheconclusionofthe entirecase，itwouldonlydeterminewhethertheevidencepresentedwas legallysufficient。o InDelalid，theTrialChamberheldthatamotionforjudgmentof acquittalwillbedeniedif，asamatteroflaw，thereisevidencebefore itrelatingtoeachoftheoffencesinquestionfortheaccusedpersonsto beinvitedtomaketheirdefence。939；Therewasnoanalysisastothe foundationsforthisprinciplenordidthisdecisionciteanyjurisprudence。 AftercitingTadi6andDelalid，theTrialChamberinBlakd。Wheld： CONSIDERINGthat，ontheselegalfoundations，basedonastrictapplication ofthespiritandletteroftheRules，theTrialChamberlimitsthereview oftheMotion： 〔1〕infact：tothemerehypothesisthattheProsecutoromittedtoprovide 〔2〕inlaw：tothemerehypothesisthattheProsecutionfailedtoshowa seriousprimafaciecaseinsupportofitsclaims。 Thatdecisionwasmadewithoutanylegalanalysisastothefoundations forthisprinciplenordidthedecisionciteanyjurisprudenceforthat Holding。 Lastly，theTrialChamberinKupregkidmerelyreferredtothetest enunciatedinTadidanddismissedthemotiontowithdrawtheindictment becausetheTrialChamberwasoftheopinionthattherewasevidence astoeachcountchargedintheindictment，whichwereittobeaccepted by〔the〕TrialChamber，could〔have〕lawfullysupport〔ed〕〔the〕conviction。 OtherthanreferringtoTadi6，theKupreikidTrialChamberdid notprovideanylegalsupportforthatstandard。 Kordidthenexaminedthepracticeinfivedomesticjurisdictions EnglandandWales，94Canada，Australia，theUnitedStates，97and Spain98andfoundthetestthatisappliedonmotionsforacquittalat theendoftheProsecution39；scaseisnotthehighstandardofproofbeyond 〔a〕reasonabledoubt。9However，thepracticereferredtoinEnglandand Wales，theUnitedStates，andSpainisinrelationtojurytrials，notbench trials。39；oAsexplainedabove，thelowlegalsufficiencystandardisused injurytrialsbecausethejudgeisprecludedfromusurpingthefactfinder39；s role。Assuch，thejurytrialpracticeinthesejurisdictions providesKordidnosupport。Next，Australianpracticeallowsforajudge toacquitadefendantafterthecloseoftheprosecution39；scase39；o39；andis indirectcontradistinctiontoKordid。 Finally，Canadianpracticeistheloneexceptionthatdoesprovidesome supportforKordid39；sproposition。However，inCanadaperstatutory requirementthefactfindercanonlyrenderaverdictafterthedefendant declares，aftertheprosecution39；sevidence，whetherthedefendantintends tocalladefensecase（anduponsuchanaffirmativedeclaration，after hearingthedefenseevidence）。102Notably，thereisnosuchrequirement intheRulesofProcedureandEvidenceattheinternationaltribunalsnor intheFederalRulesofCriminalProcedureintheUnitedStates。Consequently， Kordid39；scitationtoCanadianproceduredoesnotsupport Kordid39；sproposition。 Ultimately，whathappenedattheinternationallevelwasthatameager legalanalysisemanatingfromthedomesticpracticeinjurytrialswas appliedtothemotionforajudgmentofacquittalinnonjurytrials。Of course，thejurisprudencedemonstratesworrythatthecourtwouldusurp thejury39；sfunctionand，assuch，wouldallowonlyforacourt39；sdetermination astolegalsufficiencyonamotionforajudgmentofacquittal。This ledtoafundamentalmisunderstandingofhowsuchamotionshouldbe decidedinnonjurytrialsandafailuretorecognizethatitisimpossible fortrialjudgestousurpthefactfinder39；sfunctionbecausethetrialjudges themselvesarethefactfinders。 Furtherpropoundingthismisunderstandingwas（1）themisapplication ofthestandardofappellatereview（asinTadidandAleksovski）asthe standardforatrialcourt39；sdetermination，（2）relianceonaconsistent patterninthejurisprudenceofsolelyalegalsufficiencystandard （althoughthispatterndevelopedwithoutanyforethought），39；and（3）a demurrertothetrialchambers39；ultimateresponsibilityofdetermining guiltbeyondareasonabledoubtatthecloseofthetrial。Whatremains isaverylowhurdlefortheprosecutiontomeetforamotionfora judgmentofacquittaltobedenied。Thus，sincethedenialofsucha motionis，innosense，anindicationoftheviewoftheChamberastothe guiltoftheaccusedonanycharge，littlemeaningfulguidanceisprovided totheaccusedinconnectionwithhisdefencecase。 AshighlightedinKunara6，thejurisprudenceimplicitlyprefersin attemptstoavoidthetwinperceptionsthattheaccusedhastopersuade thetrialchambertoalteritsacceptanceofthecredibilityoftheprosecution39；s witnessesandthattheaccusedwillbeconvictedifhedoesnot giveevidencehimself39；thedefensetocallacaseinsteadofholdingthe prosecutiontoitsevidentiaryburdenofprovingthedefendantguilty。05 Itshouldbetheopposite。Thegovernmentshouldbeheldtoits burden。If，andonlyif，thegovernmenthassatisfieditsburdenofproving thedefendantguiltybeyondareasonabledoubt，thedefendantmaythen choosetowaivehisrighttosilence。Indeed，ifthetrialchamberfinds thatthedefendantisguiltybeyondareasonabledoubt，thegovernment hasdischargeditsburden。 VII。TheInvitee：TheProposedRule29（e） MotionforaJudgmentofAcquittal， NonjuryTrial Toremedytheproblemspreviouslydiscussed，theauthorproposes thefollowingadditiontoRule29： （e）NonjuryTrial。Afterthegovernmentclosesitsevidence，the courtonthedefendant39；smotionmustenterajudgmentofacquittal ofanyoffenseonthegroundthatthegovernmentdidnotprovethat thedefendantisguiltyofsuchoffensebeyondareasonabledoubt。 Note，withthisproposedrule，thedefendantmaybutisnotrequired tomakeamotionforajudgmentofacquittal。Furthernotethatthe languageintheproposedRule29（e）wouldrequirethecourt，uponsuch amotion，tomakeadecisionwithoutreservationonthemotion。 Ofcourse，ifacquittedononeormorecounts，doublejeopardy attaches。Ifthebenchindicates，upondecisionofthemotion，therewill beaconvictionononeormorecounts，thedefendantmayelecttocall acaseandmayelecttotestify。Theproposedruledoesnotincludethe prospectforadefendanttomakeamotionattheconclusionofthe evidence。39；o JustDesserts：Conclusion 〔I〕tmayfairlybesaid，that，sosoonasamanisarrestedonacharge ofcrime，thelawtakestheprisonerunderitsprotection，andgoesabout toseehowhisconvictionmaybeprevented。39；Elevatingthestandard indeterminingamotionforajudgmentofacquittalfromprimafacieto beyondareasonabledoubtistheforgottenprotectionthatacriminal defendantdeserves。Oddwouldbetheprosecutorwhowouldfussabout elevatingthestandard。Afterall，thegovernmentbearstheburdenof provingthedefendantguiltybeyondareasonabledoubt，andifthe governmentcannotdosoonitsownevidence，thedefendantmustbenot guilty。
第二部分英语四六级预测作文题型冲刺练习基于及泛雅的双平台翻转式教学模式的研究与实践圣诞限定套装有哪些多少钱烧伤后应该怎么样处理如何实施人生战略眼光长远转移矛盾我的理想医生双鱼星座六月本周运势月日月日你何时谈对象带你逛起点因为梦想光芒万丈你总要学着自己走下去二十年后回故乡那一次等待